Using a sample of 49,956 firm-years from the United States of American, this study documents that analysts place significant less weight on firm size, return volatility, and more weight on trading volume in deciding which firms to issue earnings forecasts after the passage of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) in 2000. The evidence of this study suggests that Reg FD leveled playing field among analysts, lowering the costs of covering smaller and risky firms for analysts.
Published in | Journal of Finance and Accounting (Volume 3, Issue 6) |
DOI | 10.11648/j.jfa.20150306.15 |
Page(s) | 205-210 |
Creative Commons |
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited. |
Copyright |
Copyright © The Author(s), 2015. Published by Science Publishing Group |
Reg FD, Analyst Coverage, Determinants of Analyst Coverage, Regulation, Competitive Advantage
[1] | Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR). (2001). FD e–survey Summary. Website. http://www.aimr. Com/pressroom/01releases/regfdsurveysum.htm. |
[2] | Barth, M.E., R. Kasznik, and M.F. McNichols. (2001). “Analyst Coverage and Intangible Assets.” Journal of Accounting Research 39 (1): 1-33 |
[3] | Bhushan, R. (1989). “Firm Characteristics and Analyst Following.” Journal of Accounting and Economics (11):255-74. |
[4] | Bloomberg News. 1999. SEC may bar selective disclosures by firms. Los Angeles Times (March 17). |
[5] | Brennan, M. and P. Hughes. (1991) “Stock Prices and the Supply of Information.” The Journal of Finance 46: 1665–91. |
[6] | Cameron, A. Trivedi, P. (1990). “Regression-based Tests for Over-dispersion in the Poisson Model”. Journal of Econometrics (46). pp. 347-364 |
[7] | Francis, J, D., Nanda, and X., Wang (2006). "Re-Examining the Effects of Regulation Fair Disclosure using Foreign Listed Firms to Control for Concurrent Shocks". Journal of Accounting and Economics 41(3): 271-292 |
[8] | Fortin R. and G. Roth. Analyst coverage of small cap firms in a period of brokerage firm retrenchment. Journal of Business and Economics Research (5): 17: 61-68 |
[9] | Heflin, F., K. R. Subramanyam, and Y. Zhang. (2003). “Regulation FD and the financial information environment: Early evidence”. The Accounting Review 78 (1): 1–37 |
[10] | Irani, A.J. and I. Karamanou. (2003). “Regulation of Fair Disclosure, Analyst Following, and Analyst Forecast Dispersion.” Accounting Horizons (12):15-29 |
[11] | Lang, M.H. and R.J.Lundholm. (1996). “Corporate Disclosure Policy and Analyst Behaviour” The Accounting Review (71):467 – 492 |
[12] | Merton, R.C. (1987). “A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information”. The Journal of Finance (42): 483–510. |
[13] | Mohanram R.S. and S.V. Sunder (2006) “How Has Regulation FD Affected the Operations of Financial Analysts?” Contemporary Accounting Research (23):491-525 |
[14] | O’Brien, P. and Bhushan, R. (1990). “Analyst following and Institutional Ownership.” Journal of Accounting Research (28):55-76. |
[15] | Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 2000. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading. Release Nos. 33 – 7881, 34 – 43154. Washington, DC: SEC. |
[16] | Shon, J. and S. M. Young (2011). Determinants of analysts’ dropped coverage decision: The role of analyst incentives, experience, and accounting fundamentals. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 38(7-8): 861-886 |
[17] | Young, S.M. and E. Y. Peng (2013). An analysis of accounting frauds and the timing of analyst coverage decisions and recommendation revisions: evidence from the US. Journal of Business Financed & Accounting 40 (3-4): 399-439. |
APA Style
Yutao Li. (2015). Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Determinants of Analyst Coverage. Journal of Finance and Accounting, 3(6), 205-210. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20150306.15
ACS Style
Yutao Li. Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Determinants of Analyst Coverage. J. Finance Account. 2015, 3(6), 205-210. doi: 10.11648/j.jfa.20150306.15
AMA Style
Yutao Li. Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Determinants of Analyst Coverage. J Finance Account. 2015;3(6):205-210. doi: 10.11648/j.jfa.20150306.15
@article{10.11648/j.jfa.20150306.15, author = {Yutao Li}, title = {Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Determinants of Analyst Coverage}, journal = {Journal of Finance and Accounting}, volume = {3}, number = {6}, pages = {205-210}, doi = {10.11648/j.jfa.20150306.15}, url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20150306.15}, eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.jfa.20150306.15}, abstract = {Using a sample of 49,956 firm-years from the United States of American, this study documents that analysts place significant less weight on firm size, return volatility, and more weight on trading volume in deciding which firms to issue earnings forecasts after the passage of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) in 2000. The evidence of this study suggests that Reg FD leveled playing field among analysts, lowering the costs of covering smaller and risky firms for analysts.}, year = {2015} }
TY - JOUR T1 - Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Determinants of Analyst Coverage AU - Yutao Li Y1 - 2015/11/13 PY - 2015 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20150306.15 DO - 10.11648/j.jfa.20150306.15 T2 - Journal of Finance and Accounting JF - Journal of Finance and Accounting JO - Journal of Finance and Accounting SP - 205 EP - 210 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2330-7323 UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20150306.15 AB - Using a sample of 49,956 firm-years from the United States of American, this study documents that analysts place significant less weight on firm size, return volatility, and more weight on trading volume in deciding which firms to issue earnings forecasts after the passage of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) in 2000. The evidence of this study suggests that Reg FD leveled playing field among analysts, lowering the costs of covering smaller and risky firms for analysts. VL - 3 IS - 6 ER -